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Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a widely contested diagnosis. The dominant
posttraumatic model (PTM) considers early life trauma to be the direct cause of the
creation of alter identities and assumes that working directly with alter identities should
be at the core of the therapeutic work. The socio-cognitive model, on the other hand,
questions the validity of the DID diagnosis and proposes an iatrogenic origin of the
disorder claiming that reigning therapeutic and socio-cultural discourses create and
reify the problem. The author argues that looking at the underlying psychical dynamics
can provide a way out of the debate on the veracity of the diagnosis. A structural
conception of hysteria is presented to understand clinical and empirical observations
on the prevalence, appearance and treatment of DID. On a more fundamental level, the
concept of identification and the fundamental division of human psychic functioning are
proposed as crucial for understanding the development and treatment of DID.
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INTRODUCTION
James was 24 years old when he consulted a therapist, as his girlfriend discovered his adulterous
behavior and a number of substantial purchases of which he wasn’t aware. He was confronted with
sexually explicit and vulgar computer chats on his personal computer with another woman that
indicated they had been meeting in real life as well. He was disgusted by the tone of the chats and
the actions they described, and could not recognize himself in his online persona. However, he had
to face the fact that it could be no one else but him. Also, credit card bills and electronic devices
found in the basement evidenced excessive purchasing activity, yet he had no memory of having
bought these items. James began to experience intense fear of not being able to trust himself, even
when he was asleep. Apparently he had been sneaking out at night to meet another woman, waking
up the next morning feeling tired, but without any recollection of what had happened.
This short clinical vignette presents a patient whose complaints reflect serious dissociative
symptoms. The case presented was selected from our research program aiming at the systematic
study of the process and outcome of psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Ghent University, Belgium).
In the current paper, the author’s main focus is on the literature on dissociative identity disorder
(DID), yet aspects of the case will be briefly returned to as an illustration of the addressed theoretical
debates. Given the scope of this paper, this will necessarily comprise a limited account; for a more
elaborate and systematic discussion of the case see Van Nieuwenhove et al. (unpublished).
The phenomenon of multiple personalities, currently diagnosed as DID, inspired popular
imagination long before its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
disorders [DSM-II: hysterical neurosis, dissociative type (American Psychiatric Association, 1968);
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DSM-III: multiple personality disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980)]. The roots of this disorder as a psychiatric
condition are to be found in France in the latter half of
the 19th century. Around that time, starting from rising
ideas on hypnosis, hysteria, and trauma, scientists studying
patients presenting with seemingly different personalities,
reinterpreted religious phenomena like possession and ecstasy
in terms of unrecognized psychiatric problems (Baeten,
1998).
Currently, in the fifth edition of the DSM (DSM-V; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), DID is defined as a “disruption
of identity characterized by two or more distinct personality
states. . . (accompanied by) related alterations in affect, behavior,
consciousness, memory, perception, cognition, and/or sensory-
motor functioning. . . with recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday
events, personal information and/or traumatic events” (p. 261).
The main difference with the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) is the omission of the necessity for the
diagnostician to observe the presence of different personality
states him or herself (Spiegel et al., 2011). Across diagnostic
systems, the most remarkable feature of DID is the existence
of seemingly independent personalities with amnesia of the
primary identity for the existence and behavior of (some) other
identities (Putnam et al., 1986; Boysen and VanBergen, 2013).
Given James’s apparent amnesia, and the observation that his
behavior during dissociative states was radically uncharacteristic
his usual functioning, he meets the DSM criteria for DID. At
least two personality states were noted. While he was a polite,
well-educated, and considerate person in his primary identity
state, he was more aggressive, vulgar and sexually promiscuous
in his dissociated personality state. Moreover, there seemed
no reason to doubt his amnesia of this secondary state; his
reactions of disgust (he vomited when confronted with the
chats on his computer), intense fear and strong engagement
in the therapeutic process, as well as the observations of his
relatives, indicate that there are real memory gaps concerning
this other personality state. Such distinct personality states are
mostly called ‘alters’ in present-day literature. The term ‘alter’
refers to a so-called other personality state that takes over, and
shows not only different behavior and personality characteristics,
but sometimes also different clothing styles, another language,
behaving of a different age. . . (Putnam et al., 1986; Kluft,
1988).
The clinical phenomenon of DID has always seized public
fascination and to-date remains a highly controversial diagnosis.
The controversy circles around two related issues, namely
etiology and treatment. The issue of etiology concerns the
question of the validity of the diagnosis, i.e., whether or
not DID is real. Two opposing views are defended in the
literature, the posttraumatic model (PTM; Putnam, 1989;
Gleaves, 1996; Ross, 1997) and the socio-cognitive model
(SCM; Spanos, 1994; Sarbin, 1997; Lilienfeld et al., 1999).
The latter is also called the fantasy model because of its
emphasis on fantasy proneness and suggestibility. As argued
below, debate on the reality of the diagnosis is largely off
topic as it seems that in the battle to prove or disprove the
validity of the DID diagnosis, as either a disease or as a
folly, both parties lose sight of the subject presenting these
symptoms.
POSTTRAUMATIC AND
SOCIO-COGNITIVE MODELS OF DID
In the 1990s, fierce debate emerged on the veracity of the DID
diagnosis (Pope et al., 2006). During this period, the water
between traumatic models, on the one hand, and SCMs, on the
other, was very deep: both were mainly trying to prove the extent
to which the other party was wrong. Scanning the literature shows
that often authors make caricatures of the views and arguments
of the other party, thus polarizing the discussion into an infertile
battle. Recently, a more nuanced appreciation of the different
standpoints has been reached (e.g., Dalenberg et al., 2012; Boysen
and VanBergen, 2013; Lynn et al., 2014) and both models seem to
depict a more complex picture of the etiology of DID. However,
as these publications indicate, the debate is far from settled. Below
I outline the main points of these dominant models.
The first etiological approach was put forward by Janet
(1889/1973), who considers DID as a distinct mental disorder,
and dissociation as a defensive reaction to severe childhood
trauma. Initially, this was considered to be sexual trauma,
with occasional excursions to satanistic ritual abuse (Mulhern,
1994), but more recently disruptive experiences within (early)
attachment relationships have come into focus (Schimmenti and
Caretti, 2016). From the perspective of this PTM (e.g., Kluft,
1988; Putnam, 1989; Gleaves, 1996; Ross, 1997), dissociated
states are presumed to be already present in children who use
it as a way to avoid the trauma of abusive experiences. Here
a direct link is made between the experience of trauma and
dissociation, the latter being considered “a creative survival
strategy that helped the individual to cope with overwhelming
trauma” (Gleaves, 1996, p. 42). This is thought to potentially
evolve into alter identities that are maintained in adulthood and
express themselves when the individual has to cope with stressful
situations and emotions disavowed by the primary identity.
Accordingly, in the context of treatment there is an explicit focus
on both the trauma and on the symptom of alters (International
Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation [ISSTD], 2011).
Several techniques are outlined to identify and work with alters,
making them a core element in the therapeutic process.
The main argument put forward by PTM proponents is the
strong association found between reported childhood trauma
and DID symptoms and diagnoses. Indeed, in the case of James,
we see a traumatic childhood: a dominant father who was
both verbally and physically aggressive toward the children,
and a mother who did not intervene at any point, even when
her children were in danger. Critiques have been formulated
concerning this association, which mainly address the cross-
sectional nature of most existing studies, the scarcity of research
using objective measures of trauma and the issue of false
memories that previously gained attention in the United States
(where the DID diagnosis is most common) (Spanos, 1994;
Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Moreover, there is little evidence of
dissociative identity conditions in children, a precondition within
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the PTM argument, which states that alters arise as a direct
consequence of childhood trauma (Boysen, 2011)1.
The SCM proposes an iatrogenic origin (i.e., induced by
treatment) to DID. In this respect, multiple identities are
considered to be cultural role enactments or social constructions
without a causal link with trauma (Spanos, 1994; Sarbin,
1995). The role of leading treatment models and therapist’
suggestion, together with media influences and broader socio-
cultural expectations are proposed as central in the creation
of DID (Lynn et al., 2012; Boysen and VanBergen, 2013).
Such role-enactment is not considered as deception or faking,
but as arising spontaneously with little or no conscious effort
(Spanos, 1994; Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Boysen and VanBergen,
2013). However, given this focus on suggestion and enactment,
a discourse around attention seeking behavior easily infiltrates
this perspective and further polarizes the debate. Spanos (1994,
p. 143), for example, states that “[i]n the last 20 years, the notion
of multiple personality disorder has become commonplace in
North American culture and is now a legitimate way for people
to understand and express their failures and frustrations, as well
as a covert tactic by which they can manipulate others and
attain succor and other rewards.” McHugh (1993) considers the
behavior of DID patients as a means to validate a sick role,
which in turn provides opportunities for the patient to gain
attention and satisfaction. Blaming the patient is not removed
here and unsurprisingly these assertions have given rise to strong
opposition.
Despite these provocative statements, SCM proponents make
a strong case for the iatrogenic nature of DID. Their main
arguments include the observation of important differences in
the nature and prevalence of DID across time and cultures, the
strong link between treatment and DID diagnoses with almost
no diagnoses outside of treatment (in addition to an increase in
the number of alters in the course of treatment), and the uneven
distribution of DID cases across clinicians (Lilienfeld et al., 1999;
Boysen and VanBergen, 2013; Lynn et al., 2014).
A close reading of the literature also shows that they generally
do not discard the complexity of the underlying problems (Lynn
et al., 2012, 2014) and acknowledge a pre-existing problem,
as illustrated by Spanos (1994): “the SCM does not deny that
much of the psychopathological raw material from which DID is
sculpted exist prior to professional intervention.” However, this
nuance appears to get lost in the heat of the discussion, where the
idea that the therapist might be to blame gets entangled in the use
of the term ‘iatrogenic.’
Following this model, the importance of traumatic experiences
in the history of the patient could be rejected more often than
necessary. Nevertheless, as Lilienfeld et al. (1999) argue, while the
PTM and the SCM have presuppositions that are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, they diverge quite substantially with respect
1This does not take away that in research as well as in clinical practice it is common
for people who lived in abusive childhood situations to describe dissociative
experiences (e.g., leaving their bodies and watching from the ceiling) during the
abuse. This also allowed them to maintain a relationship with the abuser – who
is often a primary caregiver – outside the horror of the abuse itself. In that sense,
dissociation is understood as a defensive mechanism serving a protective function
(Herman, 1992; Schimmenti and Caretti, 2016).
to the main explanation for the emergence of alters. However,
the SCM does not altogether discard the possibility of trauma
as a predisposing factor (e.g., for increased proneness to fantasy
and receptivity for the therapist’s suggestion), yet it does not
accept the idea that the creation of alter identities is a direct
defensive reaction to the experience of trauma. The PTM, on the
other hand, does not altogether reject the possibility of iatrogenic
factors playing a role for some DID patients; yet, no more than in
other pathologies and not as a central mechanism. Nevertheless,
the main difference at the level of trauma as a specific and direct
causal factor remains a fundamental issue with far-reaching
implications for treatment.
In the end, arguing about whether trauma is a direct or
indirect etiological factor for specific symptoms only distracts
us from an essential issue related to the underlying dynamics
that might prove more useful in conceptualizing treatment for
these disorders. This boils down to safeguarding a place for the
subject, which is crucial for any understanding of diagnostics
or treatment. Unfortunately, the subject as subject, rather than
merely victim, seems to be precisely what disappears into
the background in the trauma model. Interpreting complex
pathology like DID strictly in terms of childhood (sexual) trauma
provides an encompassing explanation (Libbrecht, 1995), yet
distracts us from the particular meaning that symptoms have for
the subject. Subjective meaning should, however, be at the center
of diagnosis and treatment (Vanheule, 2014).
Below we will explore the potential of using a Freudian–
Lacanian perspective on (1) the role of trauma in identity
development; (2) the hysterical subject structure in order to
understand dissociative symptoms and DID.
In the first part, it is proposed that examining the development
of human identity with its fundamental dividedness, might help
us to understand on a more structural level how dissociative
phenomena can arise in the face of traumatic experiences. This
relates to the question of etiology, which is the focus of the PTM.
Given that there is no unique or specific link between certain
traumatic experiences and dissociative symptoms (Bistoen et al.,
2014), the PTM cannot explain adequately why traumatic events
might lead to dissociation. We argue that the notions of
structural and accidental trauma and their relationship to identity
formation can help to understand the link between trauma and
dissociation.
In the second part, we bring in the notion of structure as
a necessary dimension to further understand this link and the
specificity of DID as it appears in current treatment approaches.
In this context, I argue that the reigning discourse on DID
could provide a mold into which the hysterical subject fits his/her
suffering. Considering the perspective of hysterical dynamics
might help to understand how iatrogenic influences can shape
the specificity of the spectacular symptomatic tableau of DID.
I argue that by focusing solely on the symptom (of alters) in
the therapeutic process we may further alienate the subject and
preclude him/her from coming to terms with the irremediable
dividedness of human psychic functioning.
While the SCM seems to consider the possibility of a
shared underlying psychopathological configuration running
through the different appearances of dissociative states over time
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and across cultures (Spanos, 1994; Lilienfeld et al., 1999), it
unfortunately does not explore such subjective dynamics any
further. Instead, it focuses on invalidating the diagnosis itself
and ultimately proving the PTM wrong. Consequently, and even
despite all intentions (see Lilienfeld et al., 1999), any dialog with
the PTM gets stuck on the question of whether or not DID
is real. When we go back one century to the phenomenon of
hysteria, where the idea of multiple personality arose, we see
precisely the same questions surrounding (conversion) hysteria
at that time. There were believers and disbelievers, those that
considered hysteria a righteous disease and those that considered
these patients as malingerers.
We will not get distracted by the question as to whether DID
or hysteria are real here: Whereas the presence of traumatic
experiences cannot serve as the linchpin of DID’s ontological
status, accepting the psychogenic or iatrogenic nature of a
condition cannot refute it. In brief, even if suggestibility is central
to understanding hysterical symptoms, it does not mean that they
are not real symptoms (see also Hacking, 1992). Suggestibility,
or what the SCM call fantasy proneness, implies that therapists
and more broadly the socio-cultural context (might) influence
the way symptoms appear and evolve, and this influence might
be detrimental rather than beneficial. While the SCM follows this
logic in its attempt to understand possible influences that may lie
at the origin of DID, it does not elaborate this further. However,
considering this in relation to a fundamental underlying structure
might provide more fruitful ways to consider diagnostic and
treatment issues.
While the link between multiple personalities and hysteria
was lost in the latter half of the twentieth century, when the
DSM’s descriptive and symptomatic approach to diagnosis came
to dominate, we should not forget that it was within theories on
hysterical mechanisms that the idea of dissociation came to the
fore: in short, dissociation was considered as the basic mechanism
in hysteria (Janet, 1889/1973, 1911/1983; Breuer and Freud,
1895/1955). Before exploring this further, I first elaborate the idea
of the divided subject as a possible framework to understand
dissociative symptoms on a more structural level.
EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN
TRAUMA AND DISSOCIATION: A
FREUDIAN–LACANIAN APPROACH TO
THE BECOMING OF THE SUBJECT
Already in its terminology, the diagnosis of DID situates the
problem that these patients experience at the level of identity, or,
in other words, in the experience of the self, of being me. Every
human being probably recognizes the experience of reacting,
behaving, or feeling in a way that conflicts with our idea of who
we are, our identity. In DID, however, these reactions, behaviors,
and feelings appear to be split off to such an extent that they are
experienced as belonging to another ‘me’ or not even experienced
consciously at all.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, identity is constructed
in an interactive process with important others and is strongly
related to drive regulation (Vanheule and Verhaeghe, 2009).
Freud conceptualized this process as the structural trauma,
the nucleus of repression as the drive can never be entirely
represented psychically. For Freud, the drive was to a certain
extent inherently traumatic.
Freud situates the development of the Ego in identificatory
processes following object-cathexes (Freud, 1923/1975). For
Freud, the inauguration of the Ego firstly involves primary
identification with primary caregivers2 and on the basis of this,
subsequent, secondary layers of identification. This implies that
the Ego is divided between these layers despite being experienced
as a coherent unity.
In neurosis, this division at the base of the ego is the source
of conflict and of repression, comprising the inauguration of the
unconscious and the fundamental division in human psychic
functioning. In this context, Freud (1923/1975) even explicitly
refers to the phenomenon of multiple personality when saying
that
“Although it is a digression from our aim, we cannot avoid
giving our attention for a moment longer to the ego’s object-
identifications. If they obtain the upper hand and become
too numerous, unduly powerful and incompatible with one
another, a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may
come to a disruption of the ego in consequence of the different
identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances;
perhaps the secret of cases of what is described as ‘multiple
personality’ is that the different identifications seize hold of
consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as
this, there remains the question of conflicts between various
identifications into which the ego comes apart, conflicts which
cannot after all be described as entirely pathological (pp. 30–31).”
Lacan elaborated this theory in his ‘return to Freud’ and put
the relation with the other at the center of identity formation and
the becoming of the subject. Early in his teaching, his work on
the mirror stage was used to show that the basis of our identity
concerns mirroring processes and identifications with what is
offered by the other (Lacan, 1949/2006, 1953-4/1988). He situates
the identification with the body image as the first layer of the
Ego: The infant identifies with the (mirrored) image and in that
way gains mastery over its chaotic bodily experience and the
disturbance initiated by the drives. Whereas animal development
could be considered as entirely regulated by the image (the
Imaginary order), the human subject must be integrated into the
symbolic order, mediated by the words of others, the signifiers
introduced (i.e., the words, behaviors and gestures of the other
that progressively informs the infant of its bodily coherence and
unity; the Symbolic order). This process, with which the child
increasingly invests, introduces the child into what Lacan calls
the whole ‘treasure trove of signifiers’ available in the broader
(immediate and cultural) linguistic context in which it must
live (Lacan, 1958/2006). Lacan (1954-5/1988) formalized this
with his concept of the big Other, which denotes both specific
others and language as the basis of our psychic worlds. As
identity is based on the primary and secondary identifications
2Freud (1923/1975) situates this in close relation to the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex and these primary identifications form the basis of the Super Ego.
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with the images and words coming from the outside, our sense
of self must be considered as fundamentally alienated, coming
from or incorporated from the Other (Lacan, 1955/2006). From
this theoretical framework, we can see how human identity is
fundamentally unstable. The split or inevitable conflict between
different identificatory layers implies that the subject is essentially
divided: there is no ultimate or true self to be found, only a
division at the core of our being (Lacan, 1960/2006).
For Lacan, when the subject enters the realm of language
something is gained, a more or less coherent sense of self and
mastery over the chaotic nature of the drive and the enigmatic
relation to others. At the same time something is lost, a leftover
that remains which cannot be translated into language.
Here, we can bring in Lacan’s concept of the Real (Lacan,
1954-5/1988, 1957/2006, 1964/1998): For Lacan the Real, is by
definition traumatic for the subject as it comprises that which
cannot be represented psychically (Freud’s structural trauma).
This is reminiscent of Freud’s definition of what makes up a
traumatic experience, namely an experience of excess tension
that overwhelms the Ego such that it fails to process the
excitation psychically (Freud, 1917/1978), where we see a certain
parallel between the traumatic nature of the drive and traumatic
experiences. Whereas the latter is an external danger and is
accidental (not necessarily so), the former is an internal threat
that is structural (necessarily so for each human subject)3.
Following Freud, Lacan situates an unbridgeable gap at the
core of our being. Identity formation (based on successive
identifications with images and words) consists of life-long
process of managing that gap, covering it, as language always falls
short of fully representing the drive.
Thus, if the primary social bond with caregivers is
characterized by accidental trauma (i.e., external trauma),
the internal (structural trauma) will be interwoven with it and
will have detrimental effects on the symbolic-imaginary structure
that makes up our identity. In other words, if the other that
we depend on to gain control over our internal experience, if
the mirroring is itself traumatic and inconsistent, the resulting
process of drive regulation and identity formation will remain
chaotic.
We could say that in a more or less stable system, conflict
between identificatory layers leads to repression and symptom
formation, in a less stable system it set the ground for a potentially
more radical dissolution of the self-experience. Here, we might
situate the relationship between trauma and dissociation vis à vis
the relationship with the Other. It seems that in DID patients,
where the trauma is mostly situated in childhood interpersonal
relationships (Schimmenti and Caretti, 2016), the resulting loose
self-experience or precarious symbolic-imaginary envelope of the
Real gives rise to a more raw and unprocessed appearance of the
division of the subject.
3In that sense, the often heard critique that Freud dismissed the traumatic origin
of hysteria and replaced it with fantasmatic structures is short-sighted. Indeed, at
a certain moment in his work he questioned the reality of the sexually traumatic
experiences, not to disregard the existence of traumatic experiences, but to indicate
that the question of reality was not primary given the inherently traumatic
dimension of human sexuality. In both cases the impossibility to represent an
experience (whether internal or external) that requires mental processing is central.
However, as this underlying division is structural and not
curable, this dividedness at the core of our being is at the basis
of all symptom development. In that sense, it is not surprising
that a number of authors consider dissociation as present in every
subject and conceptualize a continuum of dissociation (Price,
1987; Butler, 2006).
Moreover, as it is the subject who must come to terms with his
condition, it is thus counterproductive to approach the patient as
victim, since this precludes the possibility of taking responsibility,
which is the necessary precondition for all change (Herman,
1992).
THE VERSATILE NATURE OF DID
SYMPTOMS: THE HYSTERICAL
SUBJECT POSITION
Above I elaborated how we might understand the link between
trauma and dissociation within the development of the subject in
relation to others. This broad view on identity formation sheds
light on the complexity of trauma and how it might affect human
psychic functioning. However, numerous arguments proposed
by the SCM in questioning the veracity of the DID diagnosis
concern the changeable nature of DID symptomatology over
time. As indicated above, it is arguable that the specificity of the
DID pathology (the way these symptoms appear and change over
time and context) might be understood when situated within a
hysterical subject structure4.
Our exploration of the fundamental dividedness of the
subject in no way means to question the seriousness of the
pathology or even the role of trauma. However, it is clear
that traumatic experiences appear to give rise to different types
of (psychological) problems and we think the nature of these
problems depends on the structural position of the subject on
which they intervene. Moreover, specific societal and therapeutic
discourses can further shape the form symptoms take.
Below I discuss two related characteristics of hysterical
neurosis, again from a Freudian–Lacanian perspective, in order
to reframe arguments put forward in the SCM: the subject’s
relation to the Other and to knowledge.
From a psychoanalytic point of view, hysteria, as a clinical
structure, refers to a specific subject position, and not to a specific
set of symptoms (Fink, 1997). Following Freud, Lacan’s structural
approach to human subjectivity and psychopathology allows us
to look beyond specific symptomatology, as such, as symptoms
can arise from very different psychical dynamics (Fink, 1997;
Verhaeghe, 2004). From a Lacanian point of view, someone can
be diagnosed as hysteric without any of the so-called typical
hysterical symptoms: Indeed it is precisely the inconsistency
of hysterical symptomatology that characterizes this clinical
4It is clear that the notion of hysterical subject structure in the work of Freud,
Lacan, and other psychoanalytic authors should be conceived as a broad notion
designation a subject’s position within the neurotic spectrum and in itself does
not refer to pathological states. In this context, however, and in the light of what
was discussed above, we more specifically refer to subjects that qua personality
structure can be considered hysteric, but where the structure given the (traumatic)
developmental context does not provide stability.
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structure, and this is by virtue of its specific positioning toward
the Other.
As discussed above, the subject’s position, its identity, takes
form in relation to others, firstly in relation to the primary
caregiver through mirroring and the process of identification.
When the child turns to his caretakers, it expresses a demand
that goes beyond the drive-related need to express at the same
time a demand for love, recognition (Rogers, 2007). In turn, the
caregiver signifies the needs of the child, thereby placing these
needs within a certain framework; they demand that the child
behaves in certain ways, inscribes itself into the linguistic order
that is offered. The child attempts to read what it is that the
parent wants from them in order to gain love and affection. In
that sense, the primary caregiver’s desire becomes the source of
our own desire. Such early interpretations about what the Other
wants will more or less generate a blueprint, which comes into
play within each subsequent relationship, and thus also in the
therapeutic relationship with the therapist as other.
This process and the way the Other is perceived is a complex
bidirectional interactional process where subject and other are
hardly distinguishable, and can be characterized for the hysterical
subject position by a focus on fusion (in contrast with separation
for the obsessional neurotic subject). He or she attempts to meet
the desire of the Other, yet interprets the message of the Other
in the sense that what is given is not enough, that the subject
does not meet the desires of the Other. It is the Other who is the
desiring subject and it is the hysterical subject who appropriates
to this desire by identifying with it. As the desire of the Other
is also grounded in a structural lack, the hysterical subject gets
trapped in a never ending attempt to complete the Other after all.
This dominant tendency to identify with and adapt to the other’s
desire, which is part and parcel of the subject’s development
itself, allows us to understand the myriad ways symptoms can
appear (Verhaeghe, 2004). Therefore it is crucial to consider this
basic relationship to the Other as a focus of both diagnostic and
therapeutic approaches, rather than starting from the appearance
of the symptom.
In terms of James, we see his never ending attempt to comply
with the demands of, for example, his girlfriend in order to be
loved, to be the man she desires, thereby sacrificing his own
subjectivity. This implies that what does not fit the picture in his
experience of his girlfriend’s desire is repressed. Repression is a
central mechanism in hysterical symptom formation, repression
of conflicting wishes and desires of those thoughts in which one
cannot recognize oneself. Moreover, the hysterical symptom is
pre-eminently a compromise formation between such conflicting
desires (Freud, 1900/1978), which in the end go back to different
layers of identification with opposing desires of others. This
illustrates par excellence that the human subject, human psychic
functioning is not one consistent whole, but is essentially divided
(Lacan, 1957-8/1998; Fink, 1996). The subject is divided between
different desires of important others, between his own conscious
and unconscious and so on.
Following this logic, in dissociation we can see these
conflicting tendencies literally appear in what seems like two
apparently different persons, yet it is the division that cannot be
experienced by the subject that causes the conflicting desires to
be split off. This splitting of psychic activity was considered by
Breuer and Freud (1895/1955) in their famous Studies on Hysteria
as the basic mechanism of hysterical neurosis. In the case of
James, we see how his sexual urges that are not in line with his
girlfriend’s desire, his own anger that he cannot allow himself to
experience, show up in his dissociative states5.
In his/her unstoppable quest to appropriate the desire of
important others, the hysterical subject turns to others that are
imbued with knowledge, another that is expected to know. This
dynamic between subject and Other is what Lacan formalizes
in his discourse theory with the hysterical discourse (Lacan,
1964/1998). The subject, as divided, addresses the Other as
master in search of a signification of her lack, of what (s)he is
missing. The specific others that are addressed are others in a
position where knowledge is expected to reside. These positions
will change over time. While priests incarnated the position of
knowledge until the end of the 19th century, they were replaced
or complemented by medical doctors and in a later phase
psychotherapists. The hysteric turns to these others and identifies
with the answer that is provided, the signification gained for
their suffering. Because the lack, the underlying division, is
structural and language can never fully grasp the Real of the drive,
every answer produced by another will by definition always be
incomplete. In that sense, identity not only consists of a never-
ending process of successive identifications, but the process takes
place in relation to a series of different master figures replacing
each other.
Although the knowledge produced by another (such as a
diagnostic label) never covers the truth underlying the subject’s
dividedness, this does not preclude that the subject identifies with
the answer, with the knowledge produced by the other placed in
the position of the master.
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ARGUMENTS
This concise and necessarily reductionist outline of a structural
view on hysteria delineated the susceptibility of the hysterical
subject for the desire of the Other, on the one hand, and the
fundamental division of neurotic psychic functioning6, on the
other hand. This allows us to understand and reinterpret the
findings put forward by the SCM proponents as arguments for
an iatrogenic nature of DID symptoms and leads the debate away
from the question of the reality of these spectacular symptoms.
An important argument concerns the major fluctuations
over time and across cultures in the reporting of DID cases
(Spanos, 1994; Piper and Merskey, 2004). Whereas there were
a number of cases reported around the turn of the 19th to the
20th century, there were hardly any case reports between 1920
and 1970. However, since then the number of reported cases
5It should be mentioned here, that dissociative symptoms are not to be expected
for each subject showing a hysterical subject structure. It is only given certain
contextual factors (cf. the interaction between structural and accidental trauma)
that we can understand the lack of stability in the psychic system and the
insufficient working of ‘ordinary’ repression.
6i.e., the ‘normal’ human disposition. Neurotic in this sense does not imply any
statement about pathology or the absence thereof.
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has increased exponentially (Merskey, 1995; e.g., Kluft, 1988;
Putnam, 1989; Ross, 1997) and the large increase in reported
cases closely followed the publication of the bestseller ‘Sybil,’ a
young woman with a history of childhood abuse who manifested
16 alter identities (Lynn et al., 2012). Attention for DID in the
literature thus comes in waves, rather than receiving a steady
amount of research and theoretical attention. More recently,
Pope et al. (2006) and Boysen and VanBergen (2013) tracked
publication rates from 1984 to 2003 and from 2000 to 2010,
respectively. They note a sharp peak in publications on DID in
the late 1990s followed by a steep decline since that time (Pope
et al., 2006). In the first decennium of the 21st century, research
productivity was slow but steady, focusing mainly on descriptive
studies concerning the clinical features of the disorder (Boysen
and VanBergen, 2013) and its treatment (e.g., Brand et al., 2009).
From the point of view of the hysterical subject structure, it is
not so difficult to understand that literature and media attention
influences prevalence numbers. This does not imply that there
should be an increase in psychopathology in general. However,
the color of the hysterical symptoms, the terms used to signify
mental suffering and the experience of conflict is guided by the
reigning discourse.
The appearance of alters also changed over time. Whereas it
was very rare that more than two or eventually three personality
states were described in the early 20th century (Merskey, 1995;
Baeten, 1998), more recently an average of 13 alters is reported
(Putnam et al., 1986; Putnam, 1989) with extremes of up to 4000
alters (Kluft, 1988, 2006). Moreover, today alters seem to shift
immediately and without warning, whereas in the 19th and early
20th century a transitional period (e.g., of sleep; Hacking, 1991;
Spanos, 1994) was mostly described. Also the secondary states
were regularly not described as equaling the common conscious
state of mind, yet rather appear as somnambular or hypnotic
states. This is clear in descriptions of Azam (1887, in Merskey,
1995), who explained dual personality in terms of a doubling
of consciousness connected to somnambulism. In Breuer’s and
Freud’s famous case of Anna O. (Breuer and Freud, 1895/1955),
the secondary personality state is described as linked to auto-
hypnosis, a state of altered consciousness. In sum it seems that
dual personality states were linked to dual consciousness, termed
‘double conscience’ by Janet (1889/1973), which he considered to
be a fundamental hysterical mechanism.
When considering the chameleon like nature of the hysterical
subject (Verhaeghe, 2004), these observations are not so hard to
understand. As societies and cultural discourses change, so too
do symptoms. The hysterical subject adapts to the discourses
on mental and physical illness in the medical world and the
broader society. The hysteric fits his/her suffering into the mold
provided by the reigning master discourse. Again, this in no way
means we consider this to be a conscious process. Rather, these
identificatory processes are dominant in the psychic make-up
and proceed on an unconscious level, only surfacing in instances
where the subject feels fake, not knowing who she is herself and
sensing the major impact of the Other on her identity (Fink,
1997).
Not only does the hysterical subject identify with the reigning
discourse, she actively turns toward the presumed master to
signify her suffering. Doctors and therapists on account of their
professional status easily occupy the position of the master who
knows. In this respect, therapists and researchers stepping on the
barricades as advocates of the veracity of the DID diagnosis and
its traumatic origin preeminently incarnate such a position.
What is remarkable, and in line with our argument, is that
most DID cases are reported in North America and center around
a limited number of therapists and research groups. While Spanos
(1994) for example notes that the majority of cases are reported
by a small number of therapists, Gleaves (1996) argues that these
research teams used data from a large number of clinicians.
As Lilienfeld et al. (1999) indicates, however, there is a clear
selection bias with questionnaires sent out to clinicians that are
members of associations concerning dissociation, or expressing a
clear interest in the phenomenon. So it seems, therapists group
around a fascination for these symptoms, form associations and
communicate around this pathology. It is not so strange starting
from the reasoning we are laying out here to understand why
these therapists or groups of therapists find such high prevalence
numbers, numbers that are not found anywhere else. The hysteric
subject tends to search for someone that can incarnate the role
of a master figure to find an answer to what (s)he is missing
and models symptoms in line with these master’s expectations
(again, not in a conscious way, but as the basic mechanism of
psychic functioning). The therapist/master consequently finds
what he expects and sees his theory confirmed. It is clear from
the literature that a suggestive dimension is strongly present in
the work of therapists ‘believing’ in the idea of DID and its
direct relationship with trauma (e.g., techniques for mapping
alter systems, setting up communication between alters by means
of notes, blackboards, agreements). This dimension of suggestion
is further supported by the observation that in most cases alters
only appear within the context of therapy and almost never as an
admission complaint. PTM proponents argue that DID is mostly
hidden and that patients are unwilling to show their symptoms
because of shame, for example. They claim that it requires
a skillful therapist to notice the signs of DID. Descriptions
of both diagnostic and therapeutic procedures show that they
actively probe for alters, for example by asking if someone is
else speaking when a patient reacts or talks a bit differently
than usual (e.g., more assertive) (Kluft, 2006). Starting from
their fundamental psychic make-up, the hysterical subject hears
this as a suggestion (and rightly so) to which they consent by
identifying with the suggested symptom. Surely, this gives form
to an existing problematic founded on the essential dividedness
from which they are suffering. In that sense, the suggestive nature
of questions actively addressing different personalities or alters
within a patient does not create something ex nihilo. Rather, it
substantiates the fundamental dividedness of the subject’s identity
that is precisely scattered across different identificatory layers
that are often in contradiction to one another and cause intra-
psychic conflict. But we might wonder whether this division
is not intensified and pathologized further by substantiating
alter identities this way. We could say that it is strange that
such spectacular symptoms like DID go unnoticed by relatives
and other clinicians across the world, clinicians with years
of experience working with complex pathology and traumatic
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experiences. On the other hand, as these symptoms find their
basis in conflicting desires and identifications, dissociative
tendencies are not unexpected in the hysteric and serve the
function of appropriating the desire of the Other. Again, the
question is whether therapists should further consolidate these
tendencies.
Therapeutic guidelines for working with DID patients mainly
start from a trauma model and put a lot of emphasis on
working with alter identities (International Society for the Study
of Trauma and Dissociation [ISSTD], 2011). What appears to
happen in therapy from a PTM point of view is that one
‘personality’ is considered to be truer than the others. Although
treatment guidelines state that it is counter-therapeutic “to
treat any alternate identity as more real or more important
than any other” (International Society for the Study of Trauma
and Dissociation [ISSTD], 2011, p. 132), their discourse clearly
privileges certain alters and is dotted with terminology reifying
alter personalities. For example, it is this ‘better’ person with
whom literally agreements are made to control bad or dangerous
alters (‘Safety agreements,’ International Society for the Study
of Trauma and Dissociation [ISSTD], 2011). Also the focus
on identifying alters and actively “helping them to be aware
of one another as legitimate parts of the self. . . (p. 132)”
substantiates the idea of alters and fosters the splitting off of these
unbearable experiences. Such a practice essentially misrecognizes
the fundamental and irremediable division of the subject that is
so central in Lacan’s theory. Actually, such a practice boils down
to what Lacan (e.g., Lacan, 1954-5/1988, 1958/2006) criticized
in ego-analytic approaches where the analyst is supposed to ally
with the good part of the ego to concur the bad parts. For
Lacan (1958/2006) this leads to an adaptive practice where the
analyst/therapist is the measure of all things.
This brings us to another way therapists might facilitate the
creation of dissociative symptoms besides the role of suggestion
and identification with the therapist’s desire, namely the
intensification of repression and related dissociative tendencies
by misrecognizing important parts of subjectivity. As shown in
Lasky’s (1978) case of a woman presenting alter identities after
at least 50 h of therapy, the misrecognition by the therapist of
aggressive fantasies and a disturbed relational life pushes the
patient to acting it out. Mrs. G. is a black American woman in
her mid-thirties who consults Lasky for continual anxiety and
recurrent bouts of depression. He describes her and states that he
probably wanted to keep seeing her as “a charming and engaging
woman who in spite of what seemed to be a neurotic depression
was able to function in many ways which were admirable” (p.
368). In the first phase of the therapy, Lasky describes the focus of
the therapy as rather concrete, discussing domestic problems and
her history as one of ten children in a religious family. By around
the 50th session, the strong ambivalence toward her mother
because of an extramarital affair gradually came to the fore. Re-
experiencing feelings of rage started to give rise to another way
of appearing in the sessions. When the therapist noted this,
she started to put these utterances in the mouth of someone
else, who she named ‘Candy.’ After a very intensive session, she
appears the next session to be behaving in a radically different
way, dressed like someone else. When Lasky, surprised by this
change, told her he had not seen this side of her before, she
responded, ‘Get the shit out of your ears’ (p. 369). Lasky does not
question the splitting tendencies in her psychic make-up, yet he
does reflect on his own “wish to see her as well-integrated and not
seriously disturbed” (p. 368) and relates this to the appearance of
‘Candy’ as a different personality. Where Lasky, as therapist, is
able to reflect on his own desire to see her as a strong woman
who functions well, given the difficult circumstances, he allows
her to find words for the aggressive desires and the splitting
disappears.
In sum, I think that in order to achieve memory integration
it is crucial to create space for the full spectrum of subjectivity
rather than focusing on alter identities directly. Indeed, we believe
that the latter approach simply strengthens the dissociative
process and prompts new alters to appear during the therapeutic
process (e.g., Kluft, 2006). Oddly enough, it seems that in the
literature on treatment for DID (e.g., Kluft, 2006; International
Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation [ISSTD], 2011),
addressing alters is considered the only way to give space for the
entire field of subjectivity. However, as we argue here, it seems
to create the opposite: whole parts of subjective experience are
rendered hidden and repressed, as focusing on alters supports the
notion that they are bad and should not be part of the subject’s
experience.
CONCLUSION
Considering both the PTM and the SCM in detail, I actually
argued that both models hint at important mechanisms to
understand DID: the role of trauma on the one hand and the
role of the underlying subjective structure on the other. However,
while both models are busy arguing against each other, they miss
the opportunity to elaborate this fully. From a psychoanalytic
point of view we could say they are talking about two sides of
the same coin, i.e., two sides of subject formation, namely trauma
and structure; yet without realizing how this might provide the
possibility to bridge the gap between the two models.
Starting from the discussion above, I agree with the SCM’s
view that prevailing discourses on DID and its related diagnostic
and therapeutic approaches facilitates the phenomenon of DID
and leads to an imaginary proliferation of alters, as illustrated by
observations of DID patients with over 4000 alters (Kluft, 1988).
However, in line with the argument on structural trauma at
the core of identity formation, we do not deny the real basis for
this pathology, as the symptoms seem to present an enlargement
of the structural division of human psychic functioning. Different
identificatory layers of human identity often depict contradictory
desires where conflicts inevitably arise. Such conflicts are difficult
to experience by the subject and fall prey to repression. Traumatic
contexts can induce painful identifications: in such situations
the subject tries to understand the desire of the Other in an
attempt to meet expectations and thus identifies with desires
that are often more disruptive when the other is abusive,
aggressive, transgressive. . . Conflicting desires exist for every
neurotic subject, but the extent to which they derail the subject
will always differ.
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To avoid these disruptive desires and thus fail to appreciate
the fundamental division between opposing desires will intensify
and fixate conflict rather than help the subject come to terms
with them. As illustrated by Lasky’s case study, we argue that it
is crucial for the therapist to understand these so-called alters as
reflective of different unconscious desires and thus as belonging
to the subject, rather than considering them to be unreal parts of
the self that must be overcome in lieu of the good and more real
parts. This will create a space for the subject to give words to these
experiences and assume them, rather than push the subject to act
these tendencies out.
Rather than focusing on and being fascinated by the symptom
itself, we must allow the subject to speak freely and not recoil
from the darker side of his unconscious desire. This will help
the patient put it into words and will have a therapeutic effect
on symptoms, such that they dissipate. As history shows, to focus
solely on the symptom of DID leads to the invention of all kinds
of techniques (e.g., mapping of alter systems), which we argue
fosters the symptom at the expense of the subject’s desire. Perhaps
we should keep in mind Lacan’s (1953/2006) seemingly simple
adage that “Psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s
speech” (p. 206) and trust on the power of this speech that is truly
heard by an-Other to reveal the subject’s truth.
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